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INTRODUCTION
The FX swap transaction is one of the most common financial
derivatives
1 having one of the most liquid markets. It is often
considered as the most important product of global financial
integration. The importance of this market may be traced back
to its dynamic expansion in recent years and to the broad
applicability of the FX swap instrument. In the case of Hungary
– in addition to the foreign exchange liberalisation of 2001 –
this was also facilitated by increased foreign exchange lending
in recent years, as well as being partly a result of that due to the
accumulation of significant net external debt. The resulting
foreign exchange rate exposure taken by the domestic
corporate and household sector, as well as the increase of the
banking system’s intermediary role jointly led to the increase of
the domestic banking system’s demand for direct and synthetic
foreign exchange funds. On the other hand, the active role of
non-residents in the FX swap market is attributable to the large
demand for liquidity in forint resulting from the purchasing of
forint assets (primarily government securities), the hedging of
the foreign exchange exposure originating from the holding of
the former, and the taking of exchange rate positions. The FX
swap market gained an outstanding role in the operation of
Hungarian financial markets primarily at shorter terms. 
In our article first we describe the cash flows and basic features
of the FX swap and then we illustrate the typical applications
of the transaction. Further on we provide a detailed analysis of
the domestic FX swap market’s supply and demand sides,
paying special attention to the role of the banking system,
which has considerable demand for foreign currency. Finally,
we briefly describe the FX swap market impacts of the
financial disturbance in 2008 and the roles taken by the central
banks, touching upon the FX swap instruments introduced by
the MNB. 
INTRODUCTION TO THE FX SWAP
TRANSACTION
The FX swap transaction may be interpreted as borrowing in
one currency and simultaneously depositing in another, where
the claims denominated in one currency serve as collateral for
the liability outstanding in the other currency. That is, under the
FX swap transaction the parties agree to exchange the currency
in their possession (on day T0) at spot rate for the other
currency, and to re-exchange it at a later date (on day T1) at a
forward exchange rate, which represents the interest rate
difference, stipulated on the deal date. Thus the FX swap
consists of a spot foreign exchange sale/purchase transaction
(spot leg) and a forward transaction (forward or termin leg).
The table below illustrates the cash flows of the FX swap
transaction from the perspective of the counterparty, who buys
foreign currency at the initial (spot) leg:
During the intensifying integration of the global financial system experienced in recent years FX swap has become one of the most
common financial products having the most liquid market. The scope of application of the FX swap transactions is extremely
wide; they can be used for liquidity management, risk coverage, short-term yield speculation, and – combined with a spot foreign
exchange transaction – for taking exchange rate positions. In recent years the Hungarian banking system financed foreign
exchange lending mostly from forint funds. Domestic banks typically hedge the resulting on-balance sheet open foreign exchange
position by using FX swap transactions concluded with non-residents. Accordingly – with the rise of foreign exchange lending in
recent years – the net FX swap stock of the domestic banking system has increased significantly. The FX swap market played a
key role during the financial turbulence in 2008, which prompted almost all central banks of the world to take fast and
substantial measures. In the case of Hungary the disorder of the FX swap market represents significant risk for the operation of
the banking system; thus in recent months the MNB has also taken several liquidity providing measures, due to which the
functional disorder of the FX swap market has considerably eased, simultaneously preserving the stability of the domestic banking
system. 
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1 Derivative product, the value of which depends on the value of one or more underlying products or factors.
Note: The terms in brackets refer to the currency of the cash flows.
T0 T1
Purchase of EUR Sale of EUR
Cash flows of FX swap  +X (EUR) –X (EUR)
transaction –S*X (HUF) +F*X (HUF)
Table 1
EUR/HUF FX swap transactionwhere  X represents the amount of the foreign currency
purchased, S is the initial (spot) EUR/HUF exchange rate and
F is the EUR/HUF maturity (forward) exchange rate. With
properly functioning markets, the maturity exchange rate
depends on three factors: on the initial exchange rate, the
tenor and the interest rate difference between the two
currencies. The forward exchange rate – based on the
principle of covered interest rate parity – can be calculated as
follows:
where rHUF means the uncovered HUF interest rate, rEUR
means the uncovered EUR interest rate per annum, while t 
(t = T1–T0) represents the tenor measured in days. The
value of the FEUR/HUF–SEUR/HUF difference expressed in HUF
multiplied by 100 is given in swap points. If the interest
rate of the base currency quoted (in this case EUR) is lower
than that of the counter-currency (in this case HUF), the
swap point takes a positive (in the opposite case a negative)
value. 
The evolution of the swap point reflects the yield gap
between the two currencies on the one hand, and the change
of counterparty risk on the other. By transforming the above
expression, from the swap point quoted for the maturity
concerned one may calculate the implied yield difference
between the two currencies, which – in the case of a properly
functioning FX swap market – approximates the interbank
yield differences of the corresponding maturities in the two
countries. The implied currency interest rate may be
approached as the difference of the domestic interbank yield
on matching tenors and the implied yield difference. If, for
example, a Hungarian bank wishes to exchange its HUF
liquidity to EUR liquidity, it will receive as the FX swap
transaction fee (swap point) the difference between the HUF
deposit interest rate and the EUR lending interest rate from
the foreign bank providing EUR liquidity to it. If supplies in
one of the currencies involved in the transaction become
tight, the yield thereof will jump, which can also be detected
in the change of the swap point. A similar process may be
observed if the rating of one of the counterparties
deteriorates, i.e. its default risk (counterparty risk) increases:
in this case the implied interest paid by this counterparty will
increase. 
As an example, let us assume that the initial EUR/HUF
exchange rate is 264.78, the EUR interest rate is 2.5%, the
HUF interest rate is 9.5% and the tenor of the transaction is
one month. In this case:
That is, based on the relations above, the exchange rate at
maturity is 266.32, while the yield gap is 154 swap points 
(= 266.32 – 264.78)*100).
It follows from the derivative nature of FX swap that the
product may also be generated in a synthetic way. This
facility is attributable to the fact that the FX swap transaction
may be interpreted as borrowing in one currency, and placing
a deposit in the other currency. In this case – based on the
example above – a bank borrows one euro for one month at
an interest rate of 2.5%, converts this amount to forint at a
EUR/HUF exchange rate of 264.78 and places it as a forint
deposit with the lending bank at an interest rate of 9.5%.
Upon repaying the loan the amount payable in EUR will be
1.0021, and at the maturity of the deposit the receivable will
amount to HUF 266.88. This at maturity will be HUF 266.32
per EUR, i.e. it represents a net cash flow equivalent to the
FX swap transaction. Thus, the amount of demand and
supply in the FX swap market do not have to correspond
directly, since the difference may come from such synthetic
generation. 
APPLICATION OF THE FX SWAP, FX SWAP
MARKET PLAYERS
The applicability of the FX swap transactions is extremely
wide; they can be used for liquidity management, risk
hedging, short-term yield speculations, as well as – together
with a spot foreign exchange transaction – for the taking
forward exchange rate positions. Below we briefly describe
four strategies of these, together with the typical applications
for Hungary. 
The first strategy involves foreign exchange liquidity
management. Concluding an FX swap transaction on its own
– depending on the direction of the transaction – may be
considered as borrowing in foreign currency covered by HUF
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Note: The terms in brackets refer to the currency of the cash flows.
T0 T1
Cash flows of an FX-swap +1 (EUR) -1 (EUR)
transaction -264.78 (HUF) +266.32 (HUF)
Table 2
Example for the cash flows of an FX swap transactioncollateral. Accordingly, the transaction is suitable for raising
both HUF and foreign currency funds, without conversion in
the spot market and taking the exchange rate exposure. In
addition to this, the parties to the transaction do not take –
due to the existence of the cash collateral – a credit risk
either. Hungarian banks extensively use this method for
providing the foreign exchange liquidity necessary for
hedging foreign exchange-based lending.
2 Due to the high
liquidity of the FX swap market, foreign investors often
obtain the forint liquidity required for buying government
securities not by spot market purchases, but via the spot leg
of the FX swap transaction, even if they assume the exchange
rate exposure arising from holding the government securities
in the longer term.
The second strategy is to take a forward exchange rate
position for speculative or hedging purposes. The liquidity of
the FX swap market has increased to a larger extent than that
of forward transactions; thus FX swap transactions are also
often used for generating synthetic forward positions,
3 since
from a spot foreign exchange sales/purchase transaction and
an FX swap transaction one may set up a synthetic foreign
exchange purchase or sales transaction. The synthetic
forward position
4 is created by the simultaneous usage of a
spot market and an FX swap market transaction (with
opposite direction spot leg) (Table 3). 
At the time of concluding the deal the value of the synthetic
forward position is zero, thus it involves no net cash flow.
The position may be neutralised prior to maturity by a
forward position of opposite direction – where the amount
and maturity of which corresponds to the original transaction
– or by a simple forward transaction. In this case the profit or
loss of the transaction is settled at the time of closing the
position – upon concluding the opposite direction forward
deal – and the cash flow takes place at maturity. 
The forward transaction may be concluded for FX hedging
or speculation purposes. A synthetic forward HUF sale may
be generated by an FX swap transaction – purchase of HUF
against selling EUR – and by the simultaneous spot sale of the
HUF amount thus obtained. This on its own would be
profitable upon the weakening of the forint; thus it may be
perceived as a speculative short position taken against the
forint. The economic agents taking an exchange rate position
are usually taking the forward position with the banks which
have been already generated synthetically by the bank from
an FX swap and a spot transaction. However, when making
a quote for this, they separate the spot exchange rate and the
FX swap point (in this case the latter is also referred to as
forward point). 
In recent years speculation taking advantage of the interest
rate difference between currencies, so-called carry-trade,
has become extremely popular. In this case the speculator
grants a (short-term) loan in the currency bearing the
higher interest rate (takes a long position), while
borrowing in the lower rate currency. This strategy yields
profit if until the maturity the weakening of the spot
exchange rate does not exceed the swap point. That is, the
higher the extent of the implied yield gap specified by the
swap point, the riskier it is to speculate on the weakening
of the exchange rate of the currency bearing the higher
interest rate, since in order to realise a gain the weakening
of the exchange rate should exceed the yield difference
paid. 
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T0 T1
Cash flows of an FX swap transaction
–EUR +EUR
+HUF (=S*EUR) –HUF (=F*EUR)
Cash flows of a spot transaction
+EUR
–HUF (=S*EUR)
Overall cash flow 0 +EUR–HUF (=F*EUR)
Table 3
Synthetic forward (short HUF) position
2 See chapter ‘The role of FX swap in the financing of the banking system’ on page 28.
3The synthetic position includes a net cash flow and risk identical with that of the actual position, but it is generated from different transactions.
4 In respect of a certain foreign currency asset we talk about short position if the player taking the position realises a profit on the future devaluation of the currency
concerned. For example, if a market player expects that the HUF exchange rate against EUR will be weaker at the maturity of the transaction than the corresponding
forward exchange rate, it may realise a profit – based on its expectation – by the forward purchase of EUR and by selling it in the spot market in the future. This is
because, if the HUF exchange rate develops in line with the expectation, it means that the player is able to acquire the foreign currency at a pre-agreed price lower
than the HUF amount he could get for it on the spot market in the future. This also means the forward sale of HUF (short HUF). We talk about long position if the
market player realises a gain on the appreciation of the currency concerned.The synthetic position may be generated not only for
speculative, but also for hedging purposes. A typical example
of this is when the party concluding the deal mitigates the
previously unhedged part of the exchange rate risk arising
from the cash flows of the forint asset portfolio (e.g. shares
or government securities) held by him. This strategy is
typically followed by investors when the exchange rate
volatility is increasing.
It is common both with the speculative and the hedging
purpose exchange rate positions that the FX swap transaction
is concluded not for the entire expected duration of holding
the exchange rate position, but for a shorter tenor, and upon
the maturity of the transaction the economic agent does not
close his position, but rather rolls it over by generating a new
synthetic forward position. The profit/loss arising from the
exchange rate change is settled at the time of the roll-over.
The players taking the exchange rate position are usually
speculators taking advantage of the HUF exchange rate
fluctuations.
The third strategy involves the purchase of government
securities without taking an exchange rate exposure. This can
be particularly practicable for foreign investors to finance the
purchase of government securities from FX swap, since upon
the sale of the government securities the HUF proceeds may
be converted to foreign currency immediately at the
exchange rate pre-determined for the forward leg of the swap
transaction (see Table 4). In this case they can purchase
Hungarian government securities from foreign currency
funds without assuming exchange rate exposure. Investors
usually do not know in advance how long they will hold the
purchased government securities, i.e. the date of selling the
government securities is uncertain. Consequently financing
typically takes place from short-term FX swap, and the
investor seeks protection from the exchange rate risk by the
continuous renewal, roll-over of such swap. The purchase of
government securities hedged by the roll-over of FX swap
transactions may be deemed as medium-term yield gap
speculation: in the case of the shorter-term swap transactions
the non-resident player pays variable forint interest, while
upon the interest payment of the government securities held
until maturity he receives the longer-term HUF interest rate
prevailing on the date of the purchase.
The alteration of the non-residents’ government securities
portfolio and FX swap portfolio carries important
information concerning the market players’ motivations
and expectations. The weakening of HUF would generate
an exchange rate loss for the non-resident holders of
Hungarian government securities upon the interest payment
and maturity of the government securities; therefore they
conclude FX swap transactions (spot purchase and forward
sale of HUF) to minimise this risk. If non-residents reduce
their government securities portfolio and convert the
received HUF liquidity to EUR in the spot market, the
remaining maturity leg of the previously concluded FX
swap transaction (comprising a spot purchase and a forward
sale of HUF) represents a synthetic forward position
speculating on the weakening of HUF. If the non-resident
sector’s government securities portfolio increases while its
FX swap portfolio (spot purchase and forward sale of HUF)
remains unchanged, the purchase of the government
securities can be financed by its spot foreign exchange
transaction. 
When non-resident players purchase government securities
with the help of FX swap, an arbitrage opportunity may
emerge if the implied FX swap yield is lower in the currency
of the government securities than the government securities’
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T0 T1
Spot leg Forward leg
Cash flows of an FX swap transaction –X (EUR) +X (EUR)
+S0*X (HUF) –F*X (HUF)
Purchase of government  Redemption of government
securities securities/interest payment
Cash flows of purchase of government securities Principal –S0*X (HUF) +S0*X (HUF)
Interest +S0*X*rHUF(HUF)
Principal –X (EUR) + X (EUR)
Overall cash flow Interest (S0–F)*X + S0*X*rHUF=
=F*X*rEUR (HUF)
Table 4
Purchase of government securities financed by FX swap transaction
Note: For the sake of illustration we assume that the tenors of the government securities and of the FX swap are identical.yield and the maturity of the FX swap corresponds to the
planned duration of holding the government securities. 
Due to the FX swap transactions’ role in the financing of
government securities, the lack of availability of (spot leg)
HUF purchase/EUR sale swap transactions – i.e. the
functional disorders of the FX swap market – may lead to a
decrease of non-residents’ demand for government securities
or to the fast and extensive liquidation of the existing
position. Namely, upon the halt of the FX swap market the
non-resident investor holding HUF government securities is
unable to hedge his exchange rate risk.
The fourth strategy involves short-term interest rate gap
speculation. Since the FX swap may also be interpreted as a
deposit and a loan transaction concluded in parallel in two
currencies, it is suitable for money market interest rate
speculation. It can also be used for this because up to a
horizon of one year it has usually larger liquidity compared
to the rest of the money market segments. Thus the
combination of two swap transactions – of opposite direction
and different tenor – is suitable for taking an interest rate
position. For example, in the case of strong interest rate cut
expectations, by the roll-over of the swap with shorter tenor,
the bank in fact pays variable interest, while on the long-term
swap it receives the fixed interest prevailing at the date of
taking the position.
5
THE ROLE OF FX SWAP IN THE
FINANCING OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
As the aggregate result of the high net external debt of the
national economy accumulated in recent years, the resulting
exchange rate exposure taken by the domestic corporate and
household sector and the increased intermediary role of the
banking system, the domestic banking system’s demand for
foreign exchange funds has increased. The rise of the net
external debt experienced in recent years as a matter of
course entailed an increase of exposure to the HUF exchange
rate. As the resultant of the various economic players’
decisions, the opening of the exchange rate position was
assumed by the domestic private sector.
6 As a consequence of
the banking system’s increased intermediary role, its
dependency on foreign funds increased. The external foreign
exchange funds also play a role in the management of the
banking system’s on-balance sheet exchange rate risk. The
remaining foreign currency needs are satisfied by the
domestic banking system on the one hand through the
foreign exchange deposits placed by domestic players, and on
the other by synthetic generation with the application of FX
swap transactions.
Apart from foreign exchange liquidity management, FX swap
transactions also play an important role in managing the
banking system’s exchange rate risk. In recent years the
domestic banks have mostly financed foreign currency
lending from forint funds. At the same time, under the FX
swap transactions concluded with non-residents they borrow
short-term foreign currency funds and grant HUF loans.
With this, the generation of the foreign currency liquidity
necessary for foreign currency lending on the one hand (via
the spot leg), and the hedging of the exchange rate risk
arising from the foreign currency assets standing against the
HUF liability (via the forward leg) on the other hand is
guaranteed until the maturity of the FX swap. 
The domestic banks can convert the HUF amount originating
from the deposits to foreign currency and then place it with
clients either via the spot leg of the FX swap transaction or
by the spot FX transaction.
7 In both cases – as a result of the
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Chart 1





















































































































































































Cumulated net swap transactions (left-hand scale)
Stock of non residents’ HUF government paper
holdings (left-hand scale)
Cumulated net spot transactions, 1 Jan. 2006 = 0
(right-hand scale)
Note: The increase of the cumulated net swap transactions of non-
residents indicates swaps with long forint spot leg. Based on the daily FX
reports of credit institutions. Calculated from swap transactions between
credit institutions and non-resident investors. The cumulated swap
position shown in the chart is the sum of spot legs’ HUF values. 
5 In the case of that member of the currency pair, in which a loan is granted under the swap with longer tenor.
6The portfolio allocation decision of the various players depends on the HUF-FX interest rate difference, the Hungarian risk premium and on the exchange rate
expectations. Bethlendi and co-authors (2005). 
7 In the case of foreign currency loans, the loan is really granted in FX to the clients, while in the case of foreign currency-based loans the currency is converted into
forint for (and to the benefit of) the clients.sales/purchase transaction – the HUF liquidity arising from
the deposits decrease, while the FX liquidity increases by the
corresponding amount, after the placement of which there is
a foreign currency asset against a forint liability within the
banks’ balance sheet. Accordingly, the domestic banks will
have an exposure against forint (long foreign currency, short
forint position) in their balance sheet: foreign currency assets
increase, while foreign currency liabilities do not change.
However, the forward leg of the FX swap transactions –
appearing as an off-balance sheet item – from the bank’s
perspective represents foreign currency liability and
simultaneously HUF receivables,
8 thus it results in the closure
of the total foreign currency open position (on-balance sheet
and off-balance sheet) (Table 5). Thus, by applying FX swap
transactions the banking system is able to keep its total open
foreign exchange position at a consistently low level.
9 If the
bank provides the foreign currency liquidity by a simple spot
FX transaction (conversion), then its exchange rate risk
exposure will persist and this may entail additional capital
requirements.
10
In addition, even if the on-balance sheet position closes at the
aggregate level of the banking system, it still may be necessary
to reallocate the foreign – typically foreign exchange – funds
among the individual banks within the domestic credit
institution sector, where FX swap transactions once again
may play a significant role. 
Accordingly, in parallel with the rise of foreign exchange
lending in recent years and the broadening of the on-balance
sheet FX open position, the net swap stock of the domestic
banking system has significantly increased (Chart 2). 
The opening of the on-balance sheet position and thereby the
increase of the FX swap portfolio may basically be generated
by three effects of different type. It may be generated by the
change of the balance sheet total, if that takes place under the
increase of foreign currency assets (e.g. foreign currency
lending) resulting in the increase of HUF liabilities, or under
the decrease of forint assets accompanied by simultaneous
withdrawal of foreign currency liabilities (volume effect).
11 In
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8 Generating thereby off-balance sheet short foreign currency and long HUF position.
9The management of the banking system’s exchange rate risk by FX swap transactions typically takes place not by individual transactions, but at a ‘macro level’: on any
given day transactions are basically concluded in the volume and in the direction depending on the change of the total on-balance sheet foreign currency position
(foreign currency assets – foreign currency liabilities). The net balance of the newly and previously concluded, but yet unmatured swap transactions is approximately
identical with the banking system’s balance sheet open position. (It is not fully identical, because the off-balance sheet items include not only the forward leg of the
FX swap).
10 If the total open FX position exceeds 2% of own funds before deductions for excesses on limits, then capital must be generated for 8% of the aggregated open
position.
11The volume effect should be interpreted as the position change calculated from transactions net of revaluation.
12The interest payable in HUF at maturity: (X*F –X*S0)–X*S0*rHUF = X*F – X*S0*(1+rHUF)= X*F–X*F*(1+rEUR) = –X*F*rEUR.
Transaction Currency T0 T1
FX credit
Principal EUR –X + X 
Interest EUR +X*rEUR
HUF deposit
















Granting foreign currency loan from forint funds and the cash flows arising from the hedging thereof by
FX swap transactions from the bank’s perspective
Note: For the sake of illustration we assume that the tenor of the foreign currency loan, of the forint deposit and of the FX swap transaction is identical.
Based on the model it is obvious that in this case the FX swap transaction hedges only the principal’s exchange rate risk, not the part attributable to the
foreign currency interest.
12this latter case not only the FX swap demands of the banks,
but also their HUF liquidity requirement may increase in the
short term.
13 The change in the composition of the assets and
liabilities may also entail the increase of exposure against the
HUF in the balance sheet (composition effect): this usually
happens when converting foreign currency deposits to HUF,
or upon converting forint loans to foreign currency. The
additional liquidity requirement arising from the significant
devaluation of the forint against the major currencies and
from the maturity mismatch of the assets, liabilities and 
FX swap transactions results in increased dependency on FX
swap transactions. If the forint weakens compared to the 
FX swap transactions’ (implicit) forward exchange rate, the
banks will be able to renew the expiring transactions and –
depending on the agreements – to meet the margin call
requirements applicable to the existing stock (exchange rate,
margin call impact)
14 only under higher forint liquidity
requirements. Thus the high FX swap position makes the
banks’ liquidity situation vulnerable to changes in exchange
rates. At the time of the market disturbance in autumn – i.e.
in September and especially in October 2008 – an even faster
than previously observed increase in the FX swap market
exposure could be observed, and all three factors mentioned
above played a considerable role in this.
In connection with the rise of CHF-based lending in recent
years the domestic banking system typically converted HUF
and EUR liabilities into CHF denominated loans. Thus a
considerable CHF/EUR cross exchange rate risk exposure
was also generated. In the hedging of this the EUR/CHF, the
EUR/USD and the USD/CHF swap transactions may play a
significant role. This also means that in the hedging of the
CHF exposure, not only the HUF/CHF (or HUF/USD and
USD/CHF), but the EUR/CHF FX swap market also plays an
outstanding role. In recent years the application of HUF/USD
transactions dominated liquidity management, thus the joint
usage of HUF/USD and USD/CHF transactions could also be
observed in the management of exchange rate risk arising
from CHF-based lending.
The maturity of the FX swap transactions – playing a
dominant role in the hedging of the on-balance sheet
exchange rate exposure and in the management of FX
liquidity – is usually shorter than that of the loan, thus there
is a renewal risk in the case of managing exchange rate risk
with the application of these. The roll-over of the short-term
FX swap transactions may stumble over difficulties: it may
happen that banks are only able to renew them at less
favourable prices or for shorter tenor. In extreme situations,
in the case of the FX swap market’s functional disturbances,
they can obtain the currency becoming due upon the maturity
of the FX swap transaction by spot market transactions,
thereby opening a balance sheet open position and the mass
spot market FX purchase/HUF sale by the banks may lead to
the significant weakening of the exchange rate. In addition,
in the medium term domestic banks may react to the severe
disorders of the FX swap market by curtailing newly granted
loans, which may have unfavourable real economic effects.
The renewal risk, however, may be mitigated if the parent
banks take an active role in the providing of foreign currency
liquidity, due to their higher commitment on the one hand,
and to their access to ECB’s assets providing foreign currency
liquidity on the other.
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Note: The increase in the swap stock stands for swaps with a long forint
spot leg. Based on the daily FX reports of credit institutions calculated
from swap transactions between credit institutions and non-resident
investors. The swap stock is the sum of termin legs calculated at actual
HUF exchange rates. The total open FX position is the sum of on-balance
sheet FX assets and off-balance sheet FX receivables net of on-balance
sheet FX liabilities and off-balance sheet FX debts.
Chart 2
The on-balance sheet and the total open FX position
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Total open FX position Non-residents’ net FX swaps
On-balance FX position On-balance FX position
adjusted with non-residents’
net FX swaps
13 For example, if in parallel with the withdrawal of foreign FX funds the stock of HUF deposits does not increase and the asset items are not sufficiently liquid, then the
individual banks’demand for interbank forint loans will increase: they will convert the HUF funds thus obtained to foreign currency with the application of FX swap
transactions. However, as a result of the conflicts of the interbank market and the narrowing of the interest rate corridor it is more likely that the individual banks
sustaining the outflow of FX funds will borrow forint from the MNB against eligible collaterals.
14This impact is strengthened by the shortening of the net swap position.DISORDERS OF THE FX SWAP MARKET
AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE CENTRAL
BANKS
The international money market turbulence which
commenced in September 2008 led to partial drying up of the
FX swap markets. This process was mostly generated by two
factors: the significant decrease of confidence in the
interbank markets, and – as a result of this – the
unprecedented collapse of USD liquidity. As a consequence,
due to decreasing USD supply and growing counterparty risk
the implied USD yields increased on the market of the FX
swap transactions against the USD, thus in the domestic
market as well. As already mentioned, the riskiness of FX
swap transactions is mitigated by the fact that assets
generated in one of the currencies serve as collateral for the
liability outstanding in the other currency. However,
counterparty risk cannot be eliminated by either of the
parties to the transactions. In recent months this factor has
been emphasised. 
The unfolding crisis prompted the central banks to make fast
and significant interventions in the FX swap markets as well.
During 2008 the Fed concluded so-called swap-line
agreements with several other central banks. Within this
framework the Fed – which has the potential of issuing an
unlimited quantity of dollars – concluded FX swap
transactions with the central banks of other countries, which
otherwise would have been able to provide limited USD
liquidity for their own banking systems only up to the extent
of their foreign exchange reserves. In the beginning of the
year an FX swap line of USD 30 billion and USD 6 billion
was available only for the ECB and the Swiss National Bank,
respectively; however, during the year the range of central
banks and the USD liquidity put at their disposal broadened
significantly. As of mid-September the Fed had already
granted such USD liquidity to the Bank of England, the Bank
of Japan and to the Bank of Canada, the total amount of
which by then was close to USD 250 billion. By the end of
the month this amount increased to USD 620 billion, and the
agreement was extended to the central banks of Sweden,
Norway, Denmark and New Zealand. From mid-October
until end of January 2009 the Fed already provided unlimited
liquidity to the ECB, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of
England and the Japanese central bank.
The declining confidence among the major European
financial institutions had an unfavourable impact on the
situation of the Hungarian banks, too. With the
strengthening of counterparty risk concerns the limits set by
the banks for each other were severely reduced, as a result of
the parent banks’ risk management decisions, thus it became
extremely difficult for the domestic banks to find partners
ready to lend them foreign currency, and they could borrow
only subject to high implied FX yields. Due to increased
mistrust, it was primarily and typically domestic banks
without a stable parent bank background that found
themselves in a more difficult situation when trying to obtain
the necessary foreign exchange funds. It was less likely that
the foreign parent banks would stop the foreign currency
financing of their subsidiaries operating in Hungary,
especially because they had access to the ECB’s (or other
large central banks) instruments providing foreign exchange
liquidity. 
As a first reaction to the USD liquidity squeeze the USD/HUF
segment of the domestic FX swap market dried up. The ratios
between the overnight USD/HUF and EUR/HUF swap
transactions’ turnover shifted; thus the previous clear
dominance of USD observed in liquidity management was
temporarily replaced by the headway of EUR in the autumn,
which was later followed by a restoration. Our turnover and
stock figures do not suggest that the entire Hungarian FX
swap market was shattered (the turnover decreased only in
the overnight USD/HUF segment temporarily); however, the
price-type indicators (implied yield, spread between the
purchase and sale rate) referred to considerable risks in all
sub-markets. 
The deteriorating liquidity situation on the one hand was
reflected by the rising costs of the newly concluded swap
transactions. The implied yield differences and the implied
foreign exchange interest rates significantly increased, while
the implied HUF yield decreased in September and October.
Negative swap points occurred on the short tenors on several
occasions, which meant that the implied EUR interest rates
were higher than the HUF interest rates. Taking the
interbank EUR interest rates as fixed, this meant decreasing
implied HUF interest rates for the parties to the FX swap
transaction (Chart 3). That is, Hungarian economic agents
could obtain EUR liquidity against HUF from the non-
resident players only at less favourable prices. It should be
noted here that, in such cases in the course of synthetic
forward transactions generated from FX swaps, short
positions
15 against HUF can be taken essentially without
interest expenses. 
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15There were similar processes in Iceland, where investors – taking advantage of the negative swap points – could short the Icelandic crown for a long period free of
charge, thereby contributing to the collapse of the domestic currency and banking system.On the other hand, the fact that until mid-October the
domestic banking system could conclude only shorter
(typically overnight, tom next or one-week) tenor FX swap
transactions suggested that there were functional disorders in
the market. As a result of this, the renewal risk linked to the
management of exchange rate risk increased. The ratio of
transactions expiring within one month increased within the
swap portfolio. Concurrently, following the development of
the market disturbances in autumn, within the net swap
portfolio of foreign-owned banks the ratio of deals concluded
with the parent banks increased, thereby mitigating the
financial stability risks arising from the functional disorders
of the FX swap market (Chart 4).
As of the end of October, initially the decrease of the implied
foreign exchange yield, the reappearance of the transactions
concluded for longer tenors and, as of December, the
reduced use of the instruments introduced by the MNB
reflected the recovery of the FX swap market (see the chapter
‘MNB’s FX swap instruments’). In parallel with the
stabilisation of the HUF exchange rate and the reduction of
the yield levels observed in the international market, the
implied yield gaps and the implied HUF yields – i.e. the
interest revenues of FX swap hedging – increased. The ratio
of swap transactions maturing within 3 months to the swap
portfolio and the renewal risks stopped increasing. In order
to facilitate the recovery of the market, the MNB introduced
several FX swap instruments as of mid-October: in October
the functional disorders of the market also manifested
themselves in the banking system’s dependency on the MNB;
however, from December the utilisation of these instruments
fell significantly. 
The unfavourable scenario – according to which, due to the
freeze of the FX swap market, the domestic banks are unable
to renew their synthetic foreign exchange liabilities, which
could lead to the broadening of their total FX position – did
not materialise. In this case they could have been forced to
buy foreign currency against HUF in large volumes in the
spot market, which would have led to a significant weakening
of the HUF. 
FX SWAP INSTRUMENTS OF THE MNB
The MNB introduced several new instruments with the
objective of contributing to the reinstatement of the FX swap
market’s normal functioning. The first of these was the two-
way (providing EUR and HUF liquidity) FX swap tender
introduced in mid-October. With this instrument the central
bank does not provide extra foreign exchange liquidity to the
system, but reinforces its intermediary role in order to
mitigate the liquidity problems arising due to the
counterparty limits. This means that a bank having foreign
exchange liquidity cannot provide foreign currency above a
certain limit – due to its risk management rules – with
another bank in need of that currency. However, these tight
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Note: The implied forint yields calculated from these correspond to the
total of the overnight interbank foreign exchange yields and the implied
yield gap. The decrease of the implied forint yield suggests that from the
bank’s perspective the price of hedging by FX swaps increases, provided
that the central bank base rate remains unchanged.
Chart 3
Overnight implied HUF yields based on the FX swap




















































































































































































































































USD/HUF implied HUF yield
EUR/HUF implied HUF yield
Central bank base rate
Note: Based on the daily FX reports of credit institutions calculated from
swap transactions between credit institutions and non-resident investors.
The swap stock is the sum of termin legs calculated at actual HUF
exchange rates. 
Chart 4
The net swap portfolio concluded with 
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Ratio of within 3-month
(right-hand scale)limits are not applicable to the central bank; therefore it is
capable of raising larger volumes of foreign exchange funds,
which it then forwards under another transaction to the bank
suffering from tight foreign exchange liquidity. Technically,
the instrument comprises two opposite direction overnight
FX swap transactions, which are put up for auction in
parallel, at the same time. 
Starting from 16 October 2008, based on a cooperation
agreement between Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the European
Central Bank, the MNB introduced an overnight FX swap
standing facility – providing EUR liquidity – up to a limit of
EUR 5 billion, under which the Hungarian banks could place
HUF with the central bank in exchange for EUR on each
trading day at a pre-specified price in the form of FX swap
transactions. The objective of the MNB with this instrument
was to increase the systemic foreign exchange liquidity,
which was decreasing because of the scarcity of market-based
opportunities for raising foreign currency funds from abroad.
Recourse to the standing facility typically takes place at a
price that is less favourable than the market price. This
encourages the banks to realise liquidity allocation primarily
on the interbank market.
As of 2 February 2009, Magyar Nemzeti Bank introduced a
new CHF liquidity providing, fixed price one-week EUR/CHF
FX swap tender up to the limit of EUR 5 billion. Under the
tender scheme Hungarian banks may conclude EUR/CHF FX
swap transactions with the MNB at a pre-specified price. The
standing facility is provided by the central bank in Swiss
franc, because the Hungarian banking system’s considerable
retail FX loan portfolio generated the highest open position
in this currency.
Following this, from 2 March 2009 the MNB – in order to
further eliminate the uncertainties existing in the Hungarian
money market due to ad hoc tight liquidity and to mitigate
the tensions observed in the area of corporate lending –
introduced a new EUR liquidity providing, fixed price, six-
month EUR/HUF FX swap tender. The tender is open to
domestic credit institutions that undertake to at least keep
constant or increase (after adjusting for exchange rate change
effects) their domestic corporate loan lending from the
second quarter of 2009 until the end of 2009 compared to
the level at the end of 2008, while their net foreign liability
does not fall below the end-2008 level either. In addition, the
credit institutions also undertake to raise new, long-term
foreign funds in 2009, at least to the extent of the swap limit
undertaken by them and/or reduce the value of their total
foreign assets adjusted for exchange rate effects. By the
deadline seven domestic banks in the amount of EUR 2.81
billion had reported that they wished to take advantage of
this new facility provided by the central bank. Furthermore,
as of 9 March 2009 the MNB introduced a new euro liquidity
providing, variable price three-month EUR/HUF FX swap
auction – up to the undrawn portion of the EUR 5 billion
facility appropriated for the purpose of the six-month
EUR/HUF FX swap auctions – which is open to all resident
credit institutions. In this auction the MNB announces a
maximum allotment amount and a minimum expected
implied euro interest rate (expressed in maximum swap
points). The main difference between the two instruments is
that while the purpose of the six-month FX swap is to ensure
the long-term and predictable financing of the banking
system, the three-month swap auctions should facilitate ad
hoc longer-term liquidity management. 
CONCLUSIONS
In recent years the FX swap market has significantly expanded
due to its dominant role played in providing foreign exchange
liquidity to and managing the exchange rate risk of the
Hungarian banking system, the financing of the purchase of
government securities by non-residents and the taking of
exchange rate positions by resident and non-resident players.
The smooth and efficient functioning of the HUF/foreign
currency FX swap market is essential for the stability of the
banking system and also has an important role in the
operation of the government securities’ market. In the case of
functional disorders of the swap market, foreign currency
financing via FX swap transactions could become increasingly
difficult for domestic players. In this case the players would be
forced to obtain the foreign currency necessary for meeting
their liabilities using their forint funds – in the spot FX
market. This process could lead to a considerable devaluation
of the foreign exchange rate, the widening of the banking
system’s on-balance sheet open positions, and in an extreme
situation to the curtailment of newly granted loans in the
medium run, thus causing unfavourable real economic
consequences. In order to assess the pressure on the HUF
exchange rate, it is essential for the central bank to monitor
FX swap market processes. The instruments introduced by the
MNB – apart from strengthening the stability of the domestic
banking system – contribute to increasing the liquidity of the
FX swap market, which may mitigate the undesirable
fluctuation of the exchange rate, facilitate the recovery of
other markets and absorb the decrease in the placement of
new credits by the Hungarian banks.
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